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Shareholder Litigation Rights and Capital Structure Decisions 
Abstract 
We exploit the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws across U.S. states, which 
impedes shareholder rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine 
the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures. We find that weaker 
shareholder litigation rights due to the UD laws adoption lead to higher financial leverage, which 
enhances firm value. Furthermore, the positive relation between the UD laws adoption and 
financial leverage is more pronounced for firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex 
ante or financially constrained firms. Our evidence is consistent with lower shareholder litigation 
threats motivating firms to increase financial leverage. 
 
JEL Classification: G30; G32; G38 
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1. Introduction 
Legal protection of shareholders can alleviate managerial agency problems that arise from 
the separation of ownership and control (La Porta et al., 1998). Theoretically, shareholder litigation 
can be a governance channel through which shareholders deter managers’ self-serving and moral 
hazard problems (Kraakman, Park, and Shavell, 1993; Kinney, 1994; Ferris et al., 2007; Donelson 
and Yust, 2014). However, shareholder litigation has its own caveats. In particular, shareholder 
litigation could be costly to the defendant firms given its substantial legal fees and cash settlements. 
Faced with litigation risk that potentially erodes job security and personal reputation (Liu et al., 
2016), managers may pursue risk-averse strategies that negatively affect shareholder value. Deng 
et al. (2014) find that shareholder litigation harms defendant firms’ reputation and increases 
external financing costs. Arena (2018) reports that corporate litigation risk decreases firms’ credit 
ratings and increases their cost of debt. On average, the defendant firms’ market values of equity 
decrease upon the filings of shareholder lawsuits (Bhagat et al., 1998; Ferris et al., 2007). Autore 
et al. (2014) find that securities litigation leads to lower external financing. Since shareholder 
litigation risk has negative implications for both debt and equity financing, whether and how it 
affects firm capital structure decisions is unclear ex ante. This research attempts to answer these 
questions. 
Shareholders typically bring litigation against firms through either securities class action 
lawsuits or derivative lawsuits. A securities class action lawsuit is usually initiated by a group of 
shareholders who trade a firm’s shares within a specific period and suffer from a sudden stock 
price decline, aiming at recovering their financial losses due to an alleged securities fraud. A 
derivative lawsuit, on the other hand, is filed by shareholders on behalf of the firm and usually 
alleges that officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties. The main objective of derivative 
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lawsuits is presumably to push the defendant firms to improve corporate governance. Any cash 
settlements resulted from the derivative lawsuits will go to the firms rather than directly to the 
shareholders after paying the plaintiff’s attorney fees. Although derivative lawsuits can lead to an 
improvement in corporate governance (Ferris et al., 2007), their direct and indirect costs may 
outweigh their benefits. The following piece of anecdotal evidence illustrates the substantial costs 
of derivative lawsuits to the defendant firms and managers:  
“Lawrence J. Ellison, chief executive of Oracle, has reached a tentative agreement 
under which he would pay $100 million to charity to resolve a lawsuit charging that 
he engaged in insider trading in 2001, a lawyer involved in the case said. 
The unusual settlement, which requires the approval of Oracle's board and could still 
break down, would be one of the largest payments made to resolve a shareholder suit 
of this kind, known as a derivative lawsuit… Under the terms of the agreement, the 
lawyers who brought the case for shareholders would receive about $22.5 million, 
separate from the $100 million payment.”1  
UD laws, which were adopted by 23 states in the United States over the period 1989-2005, 
require shareholders to obtain board approval before initiating a derivative lawsuit. Since the 
alleged wrongdoers in derivative lawsuits usually include board members, boards of directors 
rarely grant such approval, making it more difficult for shareholders to file derivative lawsuits 
against corporate directors and managers. Nguyen et al. (2018) and Appel (2019) report that the 
number of derivative lawsuits decreased significantly following the state adoption of UD laws, 
                                                            
1 https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/technology/oracles-chief-in-agreement-to-settle-insider-trading-lawsuit.html. 
Last accessed on May 12, 2019.  
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indicating that UD laws effectively weaken shareholder litigation rights to initiate derivative 
lawsuits. In this research, we exploit the staggered adoption of UD laws by different states, which 
weaken shareholder litigation rights, as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the relation between 
shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures.   
UD laws may have opposing effects on firm capital structures. Spier and Sykes (1998) and 
Sandy (2014) argue that civil litigants have junior claims on firms’ assets should they go bankrupt, 
thus, firms can use debt financing as a deterrent against civil litigation that potentially pushes firms 
into insolvency. Ni and Yin (2018) report that the adoption of UD laws leads to a higher cost of 
debt since it weakens corporate governance, increases information asymmetry, and motivates 
managerial risk-taking. To the extent that the passage of UD laws impedes shareholders’ derivative 
lawsuits, thereby reducing litigation risk while increasing the cost of debt, firms might be 
motivated to decrease financial leverage. 
It is noteworthy that managers’ wealth, reputation, and job security are tied to the firm, 
thus, they have an inherent interest in pursuing conservative corporate policies, such as cash policy 
(Arena and Julio, 2015), to lower their exposure to litigation risk. If the adoption of UD laws 
decreases shareholder litigation risk, thereby easing managers’ concerns, firms may be more 
willing to pursue risk-increasing corporate policies. Consistent with this argument, Lin et al.  
(2019) demonstrate that weaker shareholder litigation rights lead to more corporate innovative 
activities and Nguyen et al. (2018) report that firms decrease cash reserves and boost investment 
in risk-increasing but value-enhancing projects, leading to improved operating performance 
following the state adoption of UD laws. An improvement in firm performance is likely to induce 
firms to increase debt financing to exploit the benefits of interest tax shields.  
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that firms that are prone to the free cash flow agency 
problems should increase dividend and/or debt financing to mitigate the adverse effects of these 
problems. In particular, the disciplinary power of debt that subjects firms to a fixed payment 
schedule and exposes them to insolvency risk if they fail to honor their debt payment obligation 
can substitute for corporate governance. To the extent that shareholder litigation is an effective 
governance mechanism, firms may increase debt financing to offset weaker shareholder litigation 
rights following the passage of UD laws. The opposing arguments about the relation between 
shareholder litigation rights and financial leverage indicate that the net effect of shareholder 
litigation rights on financial leverage should be determined empirically.  
We begin our analysis by examining the effects of the passage of UD laws on firms’ 
financial leverage measured by either book or market leverage using the difference-in-differences 
(DID) approach. This approach allows us to compare financial leverage of a treatment firm from 
before to after the passage of UD laws by its state of incorporation and between a treatment firm 
affected by the UD law and a control firm not affected by the UD law throughout the sample 
period. Our regression models control for variables that have power to explain financial leverage 
as documented in the literature, which include firm size, market-to-book ratio, tangibility, 
profitability, and dividend payment dummy (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 
2009; Serfling, 2016, among others). Using a sample of U.S. public firms over the period 1985-
2009, we find that the adoption of UD laws is positively related to financial leverage. Our finding 
is robust to both book leverage and market leverage and is insensitive to controlling for state-level 
political and economic conditions, corporate lobbying, and year- and firm- or industry-fixed 
effects, or industry-by-year and state-by-year fixed effects. The economic effect of UD laws on 
firm financial leverage is non-trivial. Our estimation indicates that, holding other variables 
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unchanged at their sample means, the adoption of UD laws leads to an increase in book (market) 
leverage by 0.011 (0.018), which is equivalent to 5.37% (8.65%) of its sample mean.  
The DID approach is grounded on the premise that absent the passage of UD laws, the 
financial leverage of the treatment and control firms should evolve in a similar way (i.e., the 
parallel assumption). If the treatment and control firms are systematically different and their 
financial leverage evolves in different ways even in the absence of the passage of UD laws, our 
documented results will be invalid. To ensure that our results capture the effect of the adoption of 
UD laws rather than the systematic differences between the treatment and control firms, we use 
the propensity score matching (PSM) approach to identify control firms that are similar to the 
treatment firms along several observable dimensions. We then rerun the DID analysis with the 
propensity score-matched sample but our finding persists.  
One may be concerned that both firm financial leverage and state adoption of UD laws 
follow time trends, implying a spurious rather than a causal relation between the two. Intuitively, 
if time trends drive the relation between UD laws adoption and firm capital structures, we should 
also observe an increase in financial leverage before the adoption of UD laws. Employing a 
dynamic model to examine the timing of the effect of UD laws adoption on financial leverage, we 
find that financial leverage increases following the passage of UD laws but not before that. In 
another analysis, we find that our results are more pronounced for firms that face greater 
shareholder litigation threats ex ante. Taken together, the evidence rules out the possibility that our 
finding is due to time trends. 
Financially constrained firms typically have insufficient internally generated cash flows 
and limited access to external debt markets. Since shareholder litigation may result in a cash 
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settlement that reduces the cash available to meet debt payment obligation, it is likely to exacerbate 
financial constraints and exert downward pressure on firm financial leverage. To the extent that 
the passage of UD laws reduces the shareholder litigation risk and motivates firms to increase debt 
financing, we expect the positive relation between UD laws adoption and financial leverage to be 
more pronounced for financially constrained firms. We examine the relation between UD laws 
adoption and financial leverage for firms sorted on their degrees of financial constraints and, 
consistent with our expectation, we find a positive relation between the adoption of UD laws and 
leverage of financially constrained firms; however, such relation is either negative or statistically 
insignificant for financially unconstrained firms.  
If UD laws undermine the governance power of shareholder litigation, poorly governed 
firms, which are more likely to rely on shareholder litigation as a governance mechanism, may 
substitute it with debt as an alternative governance mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Nevertheless, firms with good corporate governance should be less concerned about shareholder 
litigation threats, implying little effect of the adoption of UD laws on these firms’ financial 
leverage. We examine the relation between UD laws adoption and financial leverage conditional 
on corporate governance but find little evidence that firms substitute debt for shareholder litigation 
rights. 
Although the state adoption of UD laws is likely to be exogenous to firms, firms can select 
the states of incorporation that serve their interests. Indeed, many firms choose to incorporate in 
Delaware to benefit from its corporation-friendly laws and tax structure (Daines, 2001), which 
raises a concern that our finding is confounded by the Delaware effect. To alleviate this self-
selection bias concern, we exclude firms incorporated in Delaware from our sample and rerun the 
financial leverage regressions, but our results continue to hold.  
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During our sample period, some states adopted other laws and regulations, such as the 
Business Combinations laws (BC laws) and Poison Pill legislation, which might also affect firm 
financial leverage. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which hinders 
shareholders from initiating lawsuits, was also adopted during the sample period. To alleviate a 
concern that the adoption of these laws and regulations confounds our results, we control for their 
adoption in our analysis, but the results are essentially unchanged. We further consider a possibility 
that as UD laws weaken shareholder litigation rights, shareholders may choose to file securities 
class action lawsuits instead.  We control for the annual number of securities class action lawsuits 
in the firms’ states of incorporation in the analysis, but our findings persist. 
Our research adds to the literature in two important ways. First, our research contributes to 
the capital structure literature. Recent research finds that the adoption of UD laws leads to an 
increase in both the cost of debt (Ni and Yin, 2018) and the cost of equity (Houston, Lin, and Xie, 
2018). Thus, the net effect of the UD laws adoption on corporate financing choices, hence capital 
structures, is unclear ex ante. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that demonstrates 
a causal relation between shareholder litigation rights and financial leverage. Our study also adds 
to a growing stream of literature that examines the relations between shareholder litigation and 
corporate policies, such as innovation (Lin, Liu, and Manso, 2019), cash holdings (Nguyen et al., 
2018), governance and executive and compensation (Laux, 2010), corporate disclosure (Bourveau 
et al., 2018), or ownership structure (Crane and Koch, 2018). Although shareholder litigation is 
considered as a governance mechanism, its governance effectiveness remains a subject of debate 
in the literature. Our research provides new evidence of the negative effects of shareholder 
litigation on corporate policies to the debate.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230102
 
 
10 
 
Second, policy makers have recently adopted a series of legal reforms, such as the Fairness 
in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 and the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2017, that impose 
mandatory sanctions for frivolous legal claims that harm business operation (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
Our research provides new empirical evidence that may help policy makers to make informed 
decisions on shareholder litigation reforms. Our findings also have important implications for 
managers in making financial decisions and investors in considering the effects of shareholder 
litigation.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional background 
of UD laws, and Section 3 develops testable hypotheses. We describe the sample and variable 
construction in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical models, estimation results, and 
discussions. Section 6 provides additional analyses, and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional Background of UD Laws 
Whether shareholders file direct lawsuits or derivative lawsuits depends on a cause of harm 
and who was harmed directly. If a firm’s wrongdoings, such as fraudulent disclosures or violations 
of federal or state securities laws, caused direct harm to its shareholders, the shareholders would 
file a direct lawsuit. Direct lawsuits can be initiated by a single shareholder, while the involvement 
of multiple shareholders leads to securities class action lawsuits. If the acts of directors or officers 
harmed the company and affected shareholders’ wealth indirectly, shareholders would file 
derivative lawsuits against directors or officers on behalf of corporations. Derivative litigation is 
typically brought for the breach of fiduciary duties against directors or officers in cases of mergers 
and acquisitions, insider trading, appraisal rights, accounting issues, executive compensation, etc. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230102
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To file a derivative lawsuit, shareholders must demand that the board initiate the lawsuit 
against directors or officers. Prior to UD laws, the court provided a futility exception to the demand 
requirement. That is, shareholders could meet the demand requirement by either asking the board 
to take corrective actions or alleging particularized facts showing the futility of demand. In case 
shareholders plead demand futility, they could commence the derivative lawsuit directly without 
making a demand. If shareholders ask the board to take corrective actions and the board accepts 
the demand, the firm has two options (Scarlett, 2012; Chen, 2017). First, the board prosecutes the 
action. It would enter into an investigation after providing shareholders with plans to work on the 
demand.2 The firm may proceed with the lawsuit or make a settlement after that. Second, the board 
may attempt to solve the issue internally without relying on the court. If shareholders are not 
satisfied with the settlement, shareholders can go ahead with the derivative lawsuit.  
If the board rejects or does not act upon the demand, shareholder plaintiffs must prove that 
directors or officers who refuse the demand are not independent and that the rejection is made in 
bad faith. If such challenge is successful, shareholders can proceed with the derivative lawsuit. 
Otherwise, the derivative lawsuit is most likely to be dismissed under the business judgment rule 
(Pinto and Branson, 2013). With respect to financial reliefs, derivative lawsuit settlements go to 
corporations after paying the plaintiff’s attorney fees, and shareholders do not receive any financial 
recovery.  
                                                            
2 A special litigation committee (SLC), which consists of independent directors appointed by the board, would hire an 
independent law firm to investigate shareholders’ claims. If the SLC concludes through their investigation that 
continuing the lawsuit is not in the best interests of the corporation, the board will reject the demand based on the SLC 
report (Fischel and Bradley, 1986; Scarlett, 2012). 
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Prior to the adoption of UD laws, demand futility could be alleged by shareholder plaintiffs 
at the stage of demand requirement. By removing this demand futility option, UD laws require 
shareholders to demand the board to initiate a derivative lawsuit. Derivative lawsuits typically 
include some directors as defendants, thus, the board is highly likely to refuse the demand.  Since 
the board has an option to refuse derivative litigation, UD laws serve as a hurdle to derivative 
lawsuits. 
3. Testable Hypotheses 
Shareholder litigation is costly to firms. Choi et al. (2017) document that the mean 
settlement amount for a derivative lawsuit is $21 million, while the average settlement amount for 
a securities class action lawsuit is $29 million over the period 2005-2008. Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 
(2008) and Gande and Lewis (2009) document that a shareholder lawsuit decreases the defendant 
firm’s value by 9%-14% around its filing date. Besides its direct costs, shareholder litigation is 
harmful to firm reputation (Deng et al., 2014). Jones (1980) and Romano (1991) point out that 
cash-rich firms are more likely to be the targets of shareholder litigation due to their payment 
ability, thus, firms may reduce cash holdings to discourage shareholders from initiating litigation. 
Moreover, firms can use debt financing to mitigate the risk of civil litigation that potentially pushes 
firms into bankruptcy (Spier and Sykes, 1998). Since civil litigants have junior claims in 
bankruptcy, debt financing can reduce both the settlement amounts and the probability of civil 
litigation against the firms. Ni and Yin (2018) argue that UD laws adoption weakens corporate 
governance, increases information asymmetry, and motivates managers to take risk, leading to a 
higher cost of debt. Moreover, if the passage of UD laws undermines the governance power of 
shareholder litigation, which potentially exacerbates managerial agency problems, self-interested 
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managers may become more entrenched and reduce debt financing. The foregoing arguments lead 
to our first testable hypothesis as follows: 
H1a: The adoption of UD laws leads to a decrease in firm financial leverage. 
Deng et al. (2014) argue that shareholder litigation harms defendant firms’ reputation and 
increases external financing costs. Since managers’ wealth, reputation, and job security are tied to 
the firms, they have an inherent interest in following conservative corporate policies to lower their 
litigation risk exposure.3 Indeed, Arena and Julio (2015) report that firms that are exposed to the 
risk of securities class action lawsuits are inclined to follow a conservative cash policy. If the 
adoption of UD laws eases managers’ litigation concerns, it may motivate them to pursue risk-
increasing corporate policies. Consistent with this argument, Lin et al. (2019) report a positive 
relation between the state adoption of UD laws and corporate innovative activities. Nguyen et al. 
(2018) find that firms decrease cash reserves while increasing investment in risk-increasing but 
value-enhancing projects following the state adoption of UD laws. These authors further report 
that firms’ investment efficiency and the value of cash to shareholders increase following the 
adoption of UD laws. Improved firm performance could motivate firms to increase debt financing 
to exploit the benefits of interest tax shields.  
Firms that are prone to the free cash flow agency problem are advised to increase dividend 
and/or debt financing to mitigate its adverse effects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In particular, 
                                                            
3 Although firms can purchase directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance to protect the defendant officers and 
directors from the consequences of shareholder litigation, litigation insurance may not provide full or even partial 
coverage in certain cases, which exposes firms to costly attorney fees (Nguyen et al., 2018). Moreover, depending on 
the settlements, insurance premiums may increase significantly following the lawsuits (Romano, 1988; Baker and 
Griffith, 2007; Boyer and Stern, 2014). 
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debt subjects the borrowing firms to a fixed payment schedule and exposes them to insolvency 
risk if they fail to honor their debt payment obligations. The disciplinary power of debt can reduce 
managerial discretion while pushing firms to enhance operating efficiency, which implies that debt 
can substitute for other corporate governance devices in disciplining managers. To the extent that 
shareholder litigation is an effective corporate governance mechanism, firms may choose to 
increase debt financing to offset weaker shareholder litigation rights following the passage of UD 
laws. These arguments suggest a positive relation between the adoption of UD laws and financial 
leverage due to a possible substitution between debt monitoring and shareholder litigation rights. 
Following the preceding discussions, we state our alternative testable hypothesis as follows: 
H1b: The adoption of UD laws leads to an increase in firm financial leverage. 
The opposing arguments about the relation between shareholder litigation rights and 
financial leverage indicate that the net effect of the adoption of UD laws on financial leverage is 
best determined empirically.  
4. Sample and Variables Description 
Our sample includes all U.S. public firms from the Compustat database for the period 1985-
2009. The sample period begins four years before the first state adopted the UD law and ends four 
years after the last state adopted the UD law. We exclude firms from the utility and financial 
industries (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 4900–4999 and 6000-6999, 
respectively) since these industries are highly regulated and their capital structures may have a 
different meaning. We further exclude firm-year observations with negative book value of equity 
since these firms are in extreme distress or nearly bankrupt (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Campello, 
2006).4 Finally, we winsorize the continuous variables at their 1st and 99th percentiles to avoid the 
                                                            
4 We note that Appel (2019) does not exclude these firms from his sample. 
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effect of outliers on the analysis results. Our final sample includes 103,477 firm-year observations 
of 12,165 unique firms.  
Table 1 presents the timeline of the UD laws adoption by states. Georgia and Michigan are 
the first states that adopted the UD laws in 1989, while Rhode Island and South Dakota are the last 
ones that adopted the UD laws in 2005. A majority of firms affected by UD laws were incorporated 
in Florida, Georgia, Texas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Michigan, and Wisconsin.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We report the summary statistics of the sample in Table 2. UD law is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of 1 for the years in which UD law is effective in a firm’s state of incorporation, 
and 0 otherwise. Book leverage is the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities to the book value of assets. Market leverage is the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and 
debt in current liabilities to the market value of assets. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of 
the book value of assets. Market-to-book is defined as the market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets. Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items including 
depreciation and amortization to the book value of assets. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, 
and equipment to the book value of assets. Dividend dummy is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of 1 if a firm pays a common dividend in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Modified z-score is 
calculated as 1.2×(WCAP/AT) + 1.4×(RE/AT) + 3.3×(EBIT/AT) + (SALE/AT). Appendix A 
provides the definitions of the variables. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 indicate that 
the mean of UD law is 0.092, and the means (medians) of book leverage and market leverage are 
0.205 and 0.208 (0.169 and 0.127), respectively.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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5. Empirical Models, Results, and Discussions 
5.1. UD Laws and Financial Leverage – Baseline Regressions 
We employ the DID approach to examine the effect of the UD laws adoption on firm capital 
structure decisions. The treatment (control) group includes firms incorporated in states that have 
(have not) adopted the UD laws. Our financial leverage model specification is motivated by a long 
line of capital structure literature (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank 
and Goyal, 2009; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008; Serfling, 2016, among others) and has the 
following form:  
Leverageist = α + λ1*UD lawst + λ2Sizeist + λ3Market-to-bookist + λ4Profitabilityist + 
λ5Tangibilityist + λ6 Dividendist + Firm fixed effects + Year fixed effects + εist,       (1) 
where Leverageist is either the book leverage or market leverage of firm i incorporated in state 
s in year t. We also control for a firm’s bankruptcy likelihood by including the modified Altman’s 
z-score in some regression models (Matsa, 2010; Agrawal and Matsa, 2013). Since capital 
structures can be correlated with unobserved firm characteristics and time-varying macroeconomic 
conditions, we additionally control for firm and year fixed effects in the regressions. Firms 
incorporated in the same state are subject to the same UD law at a given point in time, thus, we 
cluster the standard errors in this and other following regressions by states of incorporation.5 
We report the results of the book leverage regressions in Columns 1-3 of Table 3. In 
Column 1, we control for firm size, market-to-book ratio, profitability, tangibility, and firm and 
year fixed effects. Column 2 further includes modified Altman’s z-score and dividend payment. 
                                                            
5 However, clustering the standard errors by firms yields qualitatively similar results. 
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The coefficients of UD law are positive (0.011 and 0.013) and statistically significant at the 5% 
level in both columns. These results indicate that firms increase their book leverage following the 
adoption of UD laws by their states of incorporation.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Both UD laws adoption and firm capital structures could be correlated with unobserved 
factors such as the economic conditions of the firms’ states of incorporation, raising endogeneity 
concern about their relation. To alleviate this concern, we re-estimate the book leverage model 
augmented with the GDP growth rate and the natural logarithm of the state GDP per capita, and 
report the results in Column 3 of Table 3. We find that the coefficient of UD law remains positive 
(0.013) and statistically significant at the 5% level. The economic effect of UD laws adoption on 
financial leverage is also important. The estimated coefficients of UD law indicate that, holding 
other variables unchanged at their sample means, the adoption of UD laws increases firm book 
leverage by 0.011-0.013, which is equivalent to 5.37-6.34 percent of its sample mean. 6  
 Columns 4-6 of Table 3 report the results of the market leverage regressions. We find a 
positive and statistically significant relation between UD laws adoption and market leverage, 
which is consistent with the results of the book leverage regressions. In terms of economic 
significance, the coefficient estimates of UD law indicate that market leverage increases by 0.018-
                                                            
6 Firm financial leverage could be driven by industry-wide common factors. Therefore, we replace firm fixed effects 
with industry fixed effects or industry-by-year fixed effects, but the regression results are qualitatively unchanged (the 
results are not reported for brevity but are available from the authors). 
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0.021, which is equivalent to 8.65-10.1 percent of its sample mean, following the passage of UD 
laws.  
5.2. Dynamic Financial Leverage Models 
Firm financial leverage and the adoption of UD laws by states may follow time trends, 
which implies that the positive relation between the two could be spurious. If the concern about 
the pre-treatment trends is valid, we should also observe a positive relation between UD laws and 
financial leverage in the year preceding the adoption of this law. To explore this possibility, we 
estimate the following dynamic financial leverage model: 
 Leverageist = α + δ1UD laws-2 + δ2UD laws-1 + δ3UD laws0 + δ4UD laws+1 + δ5UD laws≥+2 + 
X'istλ + Firm fixed effects + Year fixed effects + εist                     (2) 
The dependent variable in Equation 2 is either Book leverage or Market leverage. The five 
indicator variables UD laws-2, UD laws-1, UD laws0, UD laws+1, and UD laws≥+2 are set to one if 
the firm is incorporated in a state that will pass the UD law next two years, will pass the law next 
year, passes the law this year, passed the law one year ago, and passed the law two or more years 
ago, respectively. X is a vector of control variables including firm size, market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, tangibility, dividend payout dummy, modified Altman z-score, state GDP growth 
rate, and state GDP per capita. Columns 1-3 (Columns 4-6) of Table 4 report the results of the 
dynamic book (market) leverage models. We find that the coefficients of UD laws-2 and UD laws-
1 are either negative and statistically significant or statistically insignificant while the coefficients 
of UD laws0, UD laws+1, UD laws≥+2 are all positive and highly significant for both the book 
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leverage and market leverage regressions.7 These results suggest that the increase in firm financial 
leverage is related to the adoption of UD laws rather than due to time trends. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In an additional analysis, we follow previous research (e.g., Acharya, Baghai, and 
Subramanian, 2014; Serfling, 2016) and regress book leverage on year fixed effects and dummy 
variables indicating the year relative to the UD law adoption for 21-year period centered on the 
adoption year. Figure 1 in the Internet Appendix provides a graphical presentation of the 
coefficients of the year dummies for 21 years around the UD laws adoption. The figure indicates 
the positive and significant effects of the UD laws on financial leverage of the treated firms only 
after these laws adoption. 
5.3. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Analysis 
The DID approach is grounded on the parallel assumption that without the treatment, which 
is the UD laws adoption, the capital structures of the treatment and control firms will evolve in a 
similar way. This assumption will be violated if the treatment and control firms are systematically 
different, and their capital structures evolve in different ways even without the UD laws adoption. 
To alleviate this concern, in the next analysis we use the PSM approach to identify control firms 
that are similar to the treatment firms in the year preceding the UD laws adoption. Specifically, we 
                                                            
7 The positive coefficient of UD laws0 indicates an immediate effect of UD laws on firm capital structures, which 
could be a surprise since firms may need time to adjust their financial policy. We perform a subsample analysis and 
find that the coefficient of UD laws0 is positive and statistically significant for only the subgroup of firms with fiscal 
years ending after the calendar years but insignificant for the remaining subgroup, which implies a time gap between 
the passage of UD laws and the change in financial leverage as expected.  
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classify firms incorporated in the states that have adopted UD laws in a given year as treatment 
firms and firms incorporated in the states that have not adopted UD laws throughout the sample 
period as control firms. We use a probit model to estimate the likelihood of a firm being a treatment 
one based on firm characteristics including firm size, profitability, tangibility, and market-to-book 
ratio (Serfling, 2016). We identify a control firm in the same 3-digit SIC industry and has the 
closest propensity score in year t-1 for each treatment firm. The PSM procedure produces 689 
matched pairs of treatment and control firms. Panel A of Table 5 compares the characteristics of 
the treatment and control firms pre- and post-matching. The statistics indicate that the differences 
between the treatment and control firms are statistically significant before the matching but 
insignificant post matching, suggesting that the PSM procedure is successful in identifying control 
firms. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We rerun financial leverage regressions using the DID model and the propensity score-
matched sample over the 7-year period centered on the UD laws adoption years and report the 
results in Panel B of Table 5. Treatment is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for a firm 
incorporated in a state that adopted the UD law, and 0 otherwise. Post is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of 1 for the years in which the UD law has been adopted by a given state, and 0 
otherwise. We do not control for the stand-alone treatment variable since the regressions control 
for firm fixed effects. The results indicate that the coefficients of the interaction between treatment 
and post are positive and statistically significant in both columns, which corroborates our finding 
of an increase in financial leverage following the UD laws adoption. For robustness check, we 
rerun the analysis using the 11-year period centered on the UD laws adoption years and find 
virtually similar results. 
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5.4. UD Laws and Optimal Leverage 
Facing shareholder litigation risk, firms may maintain financial leverage below the optimal 
levels, thus, lower litigation risk following the adoption of UD laws could motivate firms to 
increase financial leverage to the optimal levels. We examine the relation between the adoption of 
UD laws and firms’ underleverage and report the results in Table A1 in the Internet Appendix. 
Panel A reports the results of the underleverage linear probability regressions. The dependent 
variable is an underleverage indicator that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s actual financial leverage is 
below its optimal one in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Optimal financial leverage is estimated as 
either the fitted value from the financial leverage regression (Columns 1 and 2) or the industry 
contemporaneous median financial leverage (Columns 3 and 4). The results indicate a negative 
relation between UD laws adoption and the likelihood of underleverage, suggesting that firms are 
less likely to be underleveraged following the adoption of UD laws.  
In a complementary analysis, we replace the underleverage indicator with the absolute 
value of underleverage measured as the difference between a firm’s actual leverage and either the 
predicted leverage estimated by the leverage regression or its respective industry’s 
contemporaneous median leverage. Note that the subsample used in this test includes only 
underleveraged firm-year observations. The results reported in Panel B of Table A1 indicate that 
the coefficients of UD laws are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
underleveraged firms increase their leverage to the optimal levels following the passage of UD 
laws. 
5.5. Value Effect of Increased Financial Leverage 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230102
 
 
22 
 
Debt financing could increase firm value due to its interest tax shield benefits and 
disciplines imposed on the borrowing firms. However, the adoption of UD laws may lead to an 
increase in managerial agency problems and a decrease in information disclosure, thereby 
increasing the cost of debt (Ni and Yin, 2018). Thus, the net value effect of increased debt 
financing following the adoption of UD laws is unclear ex ante. In the next analysis, we examine 
the relation between financial leverage and firm value conditional on the passage of UD laws using 
the market-to-book value model (Fama and French, 1998; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Bates et al., 2009) that has the following form:  
     ெ௏೔,೟஻஺೔,೟ ൌ 𝛾଴  ൅ 𝛾ଵ𝑈𝐷௜,௧ ൅ 𝛾ଶ𝑈𝐷௜,௧ ൈ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧ ൅ 𝛾ଷ𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧ ൅
𝛾ସ  ா೔,೟஻஺೔,೟ ൅ ൅𝛾ହ
∆ா೔,೟
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾଺
ோ&஽ ೔,೟
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾଻
∆ோ&஽ ೔,೟
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾଼
஽೔,೟
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾ଽ
∆஽೔,೟
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾ଵ଴
ூ೔,೟
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾ଵଵ
∆ூ೔,೟
஻஺೔,೟ ൅
𝛾ଵଶ ∆ே஺೔,೟஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾ଵଷ
∆ா೔,೟శమ
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾ଵସ
∆ோ&஽೔,೟శమ
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾ଵହ
∆஽೔,೟శమ
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾ଵ଺
∆ூ೔,೟శమ
஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝛾ଵ଻
∆ே஺೔,೟శమ
஻஺೔,೟ ൅
𝛾ଵ଼ ∆ெ௏೔,೟శమ஻஺೔,೟ ൅ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠൅ 𝜀௜,௧.             (3) 
In Equation 3, the dependent variable is market-to-book ratio, where MV is the market value of 
assets and BA is the book value of assets. Xi,t indicates a change in the level of X from time t–1 to 
t. ΔXt indicates a change in the level of X from time t–2 to t. ΔXt+2 indicates a change in the level 
of X from time t to t+2. Financial leverage is either book or market leverage. C is cash, E is earnings 
before extraordinary items, NA is assets minus cash, R&D is research and development expenses, 
I is interest expenses, and D is common dividends. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. The 
results reported in Table A2 in the Internet Appendix indicate that the coefficients of the 
interactions between UD laws and financial leverage are positive and statistically significant in all 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230102
 
 
23 
 
models, indicating that the change in financial leverage following the adoption of UD laws has a 
positive effect on firm value.8 
6. Additional Analyses 
6.1. Alternative Measures of Financial Leverage 
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the way we construct the financial leverage 
variables, we re-estimate the baseline and dynamic financial leverage regressions with alternative 
measures of financial leverage, which include Long-term book leverage and Long-term market 
leverage. Long-term book leverage is the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to the book 
value of assets. Long-term market leverage is the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to the 
sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. We report the results of the long-term leverage 
regressions and dynamic model estimation in Panels A and B, respectively, of Table A3 in the 
Internet Appendix. The results indicate that our findings are qualitatively similar. 
Several firms in our sample maintain zero leverage during the sample period. To alleviate 
a concern that including zero-leverage firms biases our estimation results, we exclude firms with 
zero leverage from our sample and rerun the financial leverage regressions. The results reported 
in Table A4 of the Internet Appendix indicate that our findings are essentially unchanged. 
6.2. Shareholder Litigation Threats Ex-Ante 
Consistent with the argument that the passage of UD laws reduces shareholder litigation 
risk, which motivates firms to take more risk by increasing financial leverage, we expect the 
                                                            
8 We thank two anonymous reviewers for the suggestion to consider the value effect of the change in leverage 
following UD laws adoption. 
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positive effect of the UD laws adoption on financial leverage to be more pronounced for firms 
facing a higher threat of shareholder litigation ex ante. We employ the DID model to examine the 
effect of UD laws on financial leverage conditional on firms’ shareholder litigation threats. We 
use a probit model and derivative lawsuit data obtained from Audit Analytics to estimate the 
propensity that a firm faces a derivative lawsuit in a given year (Kim and Skinner, 2012; Arena, 
2018). The dependent variable in the probit model is a derivative lawsuit indicator that takes a 
value of 1 if a firm faces a derivative lawsuit in a given year, and 0 otherwise. We then run financial 
leverage regressions augmented with an interaction between UD law and the estimated propensity 
of a derivative lawsuit. The results reported in Table 6 indicate that the coefficients of the 
interaction between UD law and litigation propensity are positive and significant at the 1% level 
while the coefficients of the stand-alone litigation propensity are negative and highly significant. 
These results are consistent with our expectation.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We note that lawsuits are observed ex post and the litigation propensity could be biased by 
the specification of the probit model used to predict a firm’s litigation likelihood. To alleviate this 
concern, in an unreported analysis, we classify firms in the manufacturing and service industries 
(with 2-digit SIC codes from 20-39 and 70-89, respectively) into the high-shareholder litigation 
threat subgroup and firms in the remaining industries into the low-shareholder litigation threat 
subgroup (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994). This industry-based classification is model-
free, thus, it is not biased by the specification of the litigation probit model. We estimate the book 
and market leverage regression models for each subgroup and find that the coefficients of UD law 
are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the high-shareholder litigation threat 
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subgroup while the estimated coefficients of UD law for the low-shareholder litigation threat 
subgroup are statistically insignificant. This evidence further corroborates our findings.  
6.3. Financial Constraints 
Financially constrained firms typically have limited access to external debt markets. 
Although the low payment ability of these firms reduces the litigation likelihood, the consequences 
of litigation, if any, could be more damaging for them. Shareholder litigation may divert cash away 
from firms’ business operations and reduce the cash available to service debt payment, thereby 
exacerbating their financial constraints and exerting downward pressure on firm financial leverage. 
Since the UD laws adoption can reduce shareholder litigation risk and motivate firms to increase 
debt financing, we expect the effect of UD laws adoption on financial leverage to be more 
pronounced for financially constrained firms. Our next analysis examines the relation between the 
UD laws adoption and financial leverage for subgroups of firms sorted on their degrees of financial 
constraints.  
To ensure the robustness of our results, we employ different measures of financial 
constraints including S&P long-term credit ratings (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006), dividend 
payment (Fazzari et al., 1988), and size-age (SA) index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). The size-age 
(SA) index is defined as -0.737 × AT + 0.043 × AT2 – 0.040 × Age, where AT is the natural 
logarithm of inflation-adjusted book assets, and Age is the number of years the firm has been 
included in Compustat. Firms without (with) long-term credit ratings are considered financially 
constrained (unconstrained). We define firms in the top (bottom) tercile of the SA index as 
financially constrained (unconstrained). We classify non-dividend payers (dividend payers) or 
non-rated (rated) firms into the financially constrained (unconstrained) subgroup. 
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of the book leverage regressions for the subgroups 
of firms sorted on the measures of financial constraints. The coefficients of UD law are positive 
(ranging from 0.01 to 0.016) and statistically significant for financially constrained firms across 
all three financial constraint measures. In contrast, the coefficients of UD law for financially 
unconstrained firms are either negative or statistically insignificant. Panel B of Table 7 reports the 
results of the market leverage regressions for subgroups of firms sorted on the degrees of financial 
constraints. Consistent with the book leverage regression results, we find that the positive relation 
between the adoption of UD laws and market leverage is generally more pronounced for financially 
constrained firms.9  
It is worth noting that following the adoption of UD laws, firms increase risk-taking 
(Nguyen et al., 2018; Lin, Liu, and Manso, 2019) that would increase both the cost of debt and the 
value of the firm. Since debt financing increases financial distress risk and costs, our findings that 
i) financially constrained firms increase debt financing more than financially unconstrained firms 
do, ii) firms increase leverage to their optimal levels, and iii) leverage is positively related to firm 
value conditional on the adoption of UD laws collectively suggest that the marginal benefits of 
                                                            
9 In an unreported analysis, we use the Whited-Wu (2006) index as another financial constraint measure and find 
qualitatively similar results. However, since the construction of the Whited-Wu index includes long-term debt measure 
and our dependent variable is financial leverage, the results could be driven by a mechanical relationship between the 
two (the results are available from the authors upon request). 
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debt dominate its marginal costs. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the trade-off theory of 
capital structure.10 
6.4. Corporate Governance 
To the extent that shareholder litigation acts as a corporate governance device, the passage 
of UD laws weakens the governance power of shareholder litigation, which may motivate firms to 
use debt as a substitute governance mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The substitution 
effect, if any, should be more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance since 
shareholder litigation is arguably more important for these firms. In contrast, since derivative 
lawsuits presumably aim at improving corporate governance, the substitution effect between debt 
and shareholder litigation rights should be less important for well-governed firms. 
We run financial leverage regressions augmented with corporate governance measures 
proxied by institutional ownership and hostile takeover index and their interactions with UD law.11 
The hostile takeover index constructed by Cain et al. (2017) measures firm-level takeover 
susceptibility. By construction, a larger (smaller) institutional ownership or higher (lower) hostile 
takeover index score implies better (worse) corporate governance. The results of the book and 
market leverage regressions reported in Table 8 indicate that the coefficients of UD law remain 
                                                            
10 We also consider a possible increase in information asymmetry following the adoption of UD laws as an alternative 
explanation for our results. However, we find that firms increase corporate disclosure following the adoption of UD 
laws, which is consistent with the finding of Bourveau et al. (2018), implying that information asymmetry is not likely 
to be the driver of our results. 
11 Our findings are qualitatively unchanged if we use the GIM antitakeover index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) or BCF entrenchment index constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) instead of the hostile 
takeover index. 
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positive and statistically significant in all models. The coefficients of the stand-alone hostile 
takeover index and institutional ownership are negative and highly significant. Finally, the 
coefficients of the interaction between UD law and governance measures are statistically 
insignificant for book leverage models. However, the coefficients of the interaction between UD 
law and hostile takeover index (institutional ownership) are negative (positive) and statistically 
significant for the market leverage models, indicating mixed results. Moreover, since a change in 
market leverage could be affected by the change in the market value of equity rather than debt 
financing, we refrain from drawing a conclusion from this market leverage analysis. Overall, our 
evidence based on the results of the book leverage regressions does not support the argument that 
firms increase debt financing as a governance mechanism substitute for shareholder litigation 
rights. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
6.5. Other Laws, Regulations, and Securities Class Action Lawsuits 
 Our results could be confounded by the state adoption of other laws and regulations during 
the sample period, such as the Business Combinations laws (BC laws) and Poison Pill legislation 
(PP laws), which can affect firms’ financing decisions. The Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which was adopted during our sample period, also hinders shareholders’ 
initiation of lawsuits since it requires the plaintiffs to present evidence of managers intentionally 
deceiving shareholders (Nguyen et al., 2018). To mitigate concern about possible confounding 
effects of these laws, we rerun the financial leverage regressions while controlling for the state 
adoption of BC laws, PP laws, and PSLRA. We define BC laws (PP laws) as an indicator variable 
that takes a value of 1 for a state-year in which the BC law (PP law) is effective, and 0 otherwise. 
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PSLRA dummy is an indicator that takes a value of 1 for the years in which PSLRA is effective, 
and 0 otherwise. The estimation results for book leverage and market leverage reported in Columns 
1 and 3, respectively, of Table 9 indicate that the coefficients of UD law remain positive and 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, suggesting that our findings are robust to controlling for the 
adoption of the BC laws, PP laws, and PSLRA.  
 Corporate policies could also be affected by the state adoption of other antitakeover laws 
during our sample period, such as the Control Share Acquisition laws (CS laws), Fair Price laws 
(FP laws), and Directors’ Duties laws (DD laws) (Karpoff and Wittry, 2018). To alleviate this 
concern, we further control for the state adoption of these antitakeover laws in the leverage 
regressions and report the results in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 9. The results indicate that the 
coefficients of UD Law remain positive and highly significant.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Faced with obstacles to initiating derivative lawsuits following the adoption of UD laws, 
shareholders may resort to securities class action lawsuits as an alternative mechanism to address 
managerial misconduct (Nguyen et al., 2018). Cheng et al. (2010) observe that securities class 
action lawsuits with institutional investors as lead plaintiffs are more likely to succeed and 
typically have greater settlements than those with individual lead plaintiffs do. Thus, the passage 
of UD laws may increase the number of securities class action lawsuits, particularly those lead by 
institutional investors. To explore a possibility that shareholders may substitute securities class 
action lawsuits for derivative lawsuits, we obtain the data on securities class action lawsuits and 
their lead plaintiffs for the period 1996-2015 from Cornerstone Research and Stanford Law School 
and examine their relations with the adoption of UD laws. Similar to Nguyen et al. (2018), we do 
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not find a significant relation between the adoption of UD laws and the number of securities class 
action lawsuits or the ones with institutional investors as lead plaintiffs (the results are not reported 
for brevity but are available from the authors). This result is inconsistent with a direct substitution 
between derivative lawsuits and securities class action lawsuits. We further run financial leverage 
regressions that control for the frequency of securities class action lawsuits measured as the natural 
logarithm of either the number of securities class action lawsuits or the number of securities class 
action lawsuits initiated by institutional investors in a firm’s state of incorporation in a given year. 
The results reported in Table A5 in the Internet Appendix indicate that our findings continue to 
hold.  
6.6. Exclusion of Firms Incorporated in Delaware 
Many firms choose to incorporate in Delaware to benefit from its corporation-friendly laws 
and tax structure (Daines, 2001), which might raise a concern that our observed positive relation 
between UD laws adoption and financial leverage is confounded by the Delaware effect. To 
mitigate this concern, we rerun financial leverage regressions using a subsample that excludes 
firms incorporated in Delaware and report the results in Table A6 in the Internet Appendix. We 
find that the coefficients of UD laws are positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% 
levels in all models, suggesting that our finding is not biased by the Delaware effect. We further 
run the dynamic financial leverage regressions for a subsample that excludes firms incorporated 
in Delaware. The results reported in Panel C of Table A6 in the Internet Appendix indicate that 
our results are essentially unchanged.12 
                                                            
12 In 2003, Delaware courts lowered hurdles to derivative lawsuits by amending Section 220 (“Inspection of Books 
and Records”) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Since this Delaware’s judicial reform encouraged 
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6.7. Placebo Tests 
Our analyses thus far have accounted for state-level economic conditions such as GDP 
growth and GDP per capita and other laws and regulations, which may correlate with firm capital 
structures. However, it is possible that our finding of a positive relation between the passage of 
UD laws and financial leverage is driven by other unobserved shocks that took place around the 
time of the state adoption of UD laws. To address this concern, in the next robustness check, we 
run placebo tests based on counterfactual state adoption of UD laws using the framework 
suggested by Cornaggia et al. (2015). Specifically, we first obtain the empirical distribution of the 
UD laws adoption years by states during the sample period 1985-2009. We then randomly assign 
states into the UD laws adoption years (without replacement) following the empirical distribution. 
This approach maintains the distribution of UD laws adoption years but disrupts the proper 
assignment of UD laws adoption years to states. Since the randomization process counterfactually 
assigns non-adopted states to actual adoption years, it should weaken the positive relation between 
the UD laws adoption and financial leverage. The results reported in Table A7 in the Internet 
Appendix indicate a negative relation between UD_placebo_dummy and financial leverage, which 
is inconsistent with our findings based on true UD laws adoption.  
To strengthen the statistical inference of the placebo test, we repeat the randomization 
process of assigning states to UD laws adoption years 1,000 times. We then rerun financial 
                                                            
shareholders to pursue derivative litigation (Qi and Pederson, 2019), we investigate the effect of this Delaware’s 
reform on financial leverage and whether our results are robust to controlling for this reform. In unreported results, 
we find that the 2003 Delaware litigation law is negatively associated with financial leverage and that our findings 
remain robust to controlling for the reform. 
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leverage regressions using the randomly generated UD laws adoption data and obtain the t-
statistics of the UD_placebo_dummy variable. We find that most of the coefficients of 
UD_placebo_dummy are either negative or statistically insignificant. This evidence indicates that 
the positive relation between the UD laws adoption and financial leverage is not likely to be driven 
by the placebo effects.  
6.8. Net Debt Issues 
 The change in financial leverage could be driven by either the change in debt or equity 
financing or both. To ascertain that our results are driven by an increase in firms’ debt financing 
rather than a decrease in equity value or equity financing, we examine the effect of the UD laws 
adoption on net debt issues. We regress net debt issues on UD law, financing deficit (FD), and 
other control variables but augment the regression with an interaction between UD law and FD 
(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011). Net 
debt issues is calculated as the difference between long-term debt issuance and long-term debt 
reduction, scaled by the book value of assets. FD is measured as cash dividends plus net 
investments plus the change in working capital, less cash flow, all scaled by the book value of 
assets. The interaction UD law×FD captures the effect of the UD laws adoption on corporate debt 
financing conditional on a firm’s financing deficit. The estimation results reported in Table 10 
indicate that the coefficients of the interaction terms are positive (ranging from 0.077 to 0.087) 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms with financing deficit use more 
debt financing following the UD laws adoption. In an unreported analysis, we run net equity issues 
regressions augmented with an interaction between UD law and financing deficit but do not find 
significant results.   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230102
 
 
33 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
6.9. Other Robustness Checks 
Nguyen et al. (2018) report that firms increase investment in value-enhancing projects 
following the passage of UD laws. Since financial leverage is closely related to corporate 
investments, it is possible that the adoption of UD laws affects both financial leverage and 
investment simultaneously. To explore this possibility, we estimate investment and financial 
leverage simultaneous equation using the two-stage instrumental variable (IV) regression method. 
We adopt the classic investment model in which investment, measured as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to the book value of assets, is a function of lagged Tobin’s Q, contemporaneous cash 
flows, and firm- and year-fixed effects (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988). Table A8 in the Internet 
Appendix reports the second-stage estimation results of the financial leverage IV regressions. We 
find that the positive relation between UD laws adoption and financial leverage remains 
unchanged. This evidence also implies that the effect of the UD laws adoption on financial leverage 
extends beyond its effect on corporate investment. Moreover, the negative relation between 
investment and financial leverage is consistent with the evidence documented in the literature (e.g., 
Lang, Ofek, and Stulz, 1996). 
Shareholders concerned with weaker litigation rights following the adoption of UD laws 
may push firms to increase payouts, which could mechanically increase financial leverage if firms 
use stock repurchases as a form of payout. To rule out this alternative explanation, we rerun 
financial leverage regressions that control for dividends, stock repurchases, or total payouts and 
report the results in Table A9 in the Internet Appendix. We find that our results are virtually 
unchanged. 
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Firms incorporated in the same state are likely to be affected by the same unobserved state-
level shocks. Therefore, we re-estimate the financial leverage regressions that control for the state 
of incorporation and year fixed effects, or state of incorporation-by-year fixed effects. The 
estimation results reported in Table A10 in the Internet Appendix indicate that our findings persist. 
The adoption of UD law could reflect the political condition of a state, and firms may 
choose states of incorporation that have a political environment favorable for their business 
operation. This possibility indicates the need to control for state political conditions. We rerun 
financial leverage regressions that control for state political balance proxied by the state-level 
fraction of the Democratic Party members in the House of Representatives in a given year and 
report the results in Table A11 in the Internet Appendix. The results indicate that the coefficients 
of UD law remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all models. 
Although the adoption of UD law is beyond the control of a single firm, firms may lobby 
states for the adoption of UD laws to reduce shareholder litigation risk, which raises concern about 
the exogeneity of the UD laws adoption. It is noteworthy that among the states that adopted UD 
laws, Pennsylvania is the only state in which the law was adopted by its Supreme Court, which is 
less susceptible to corporate lobbying. Thus, to mitigate a concern about corporate lobbying that 
may affect our findings, we run financial leverage regressions for a subsample of firms 
incorporated in Pennsylvania and its bordering states including Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, and West Virginia. Since none of the states that border Pennsylvania adopted 
the UD laws during the sample period, firms incorporated in these states are used as control firms 
in this analysis. The results reported in Panel A of Table A12 in the Internet Appendix indicate 
that our findings are qualitatively unchanged.  
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We further use the PSM approach to identify control firms that are similar to the firms 
incorporated in Pennsylvania (i.e., treatment firms) in the year preceding the UD laws adoption. 
We re-estimate the financial leverage regressions using the DID model and the propensity score-
matched sample over the 7-year or 11-year period centered on the UD law adoption year of 
Pennsylvania and report the results in Panel B of Table A12. The results indicate that the 
coefficients of the interaction between treatment and post are positive and statistically significant 
in all four columns, which corroborate our finding of an increase in financial leverage following 
the UD laws adoption. 
Although increasing financial leverage could increase firm value and benefit shareholders, 
it does not necessarily serve the interest of managers since higher leverage also heightens financial 
distress and insolvency risk. However, managers could be motivated to increase debt financing 
following the adoption of UD laws if their interests are aligned with those of the shareholders. In 
the next robustness check, we examine the relation between UD laws adoption and financial 
leverage conditional on the alignment of interest between managers and shareholders proxied by 
managerial stock ownership. Larger managerial stock ownership implies a closer interest 
alignment between managers and shareholders. We obtain CEO stock ownership data from the 
Execucomp database. We run financial leverage regressions augmented with managerial stock 
ownership and its interaction with UD Law and report the results in Table A13 of the Internet 
Appendix. Since Execucomp reports compensation data for managers of only S&P 1500 firms 
from 1992 and many firms do not report CEO ownership, the regression sample is small. 
Nevertheless, we find that the coefficients of the interactions between managerial ownership and 
UD law are positive and statistically significant, indicating that the positive effects of UD laws 
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adoption of corporate leverage are more pronounced for firms with closer alignment of interest 
between managers and shareholders.  
In the final robustness check, we exploit the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling 
of July 2, 1999 (re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation) as an exogenous change to the 
stringency of securities class action litigation standards to identify the relation between shareholder 
litigation rights and financial leverage. The ruling increases the hurdle for bringing securities class 
action litigation against corporations headquartered in the Ninth Circuit by mandating plaintiffs to 
prove clear evidence of intentional managerial misbehavior. This higher requirement decreases 
securities class action risk for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit significantly (Pritchard and 
Sale, 2005; Huang, Roychowdhury and Sletten, 2019). Crane and Koch (2018) report that the 
number of class action lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit decreased by 43% following the ruling while 
the number of class action lawsuits increased by 14% in other circuits. We expect that lower 
securities class action threat following this ruling leads to higher financial leverage. 
We run leverage regressions for a subsample of firms headquartered in states under the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and their neighboring states. Since no 
neighboring state was affected by a similar ruling during the sample period, firms located in these 
states are used as controls in the regressions. We construct the Ninth Circuit Court Ruling indicator 
variable, which is set to one for the years in which U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling is 
effective in a firm’s headquartered states (including Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington), and zero otherwise. The estimation results and 
reported in Table A14 in the Internet Appendix indicate that the coefficients of Ninth Circuit Court 
Ruling are positive (ranging from 0.01 to 0.018) and highly significant, suggesting that firms 
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increase financial leverage following a decrease in shareholder litigation risk. These results are 
consistent with our finding based on the UD laws adoption. 
7. Conclusions 
 We use the staggered adoption of UD laws by U.S. states over the period 1989-2005 as a 
quasi-natural experiment to examine the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm 
capital structures. We find that firms increase financial leverage following the passage of UD laws 
that weakens shareholder litigation rights. Our finding is robust to both book and market leverage 
measures and is not sensitive to controlling for state political and economic conditions, potential 
corporate lobbying, and industry, firm, and year fixed effects. Our results are unlikely to be 
confounded by the passage of other laws and regulations during the sample period. Moreover, the 
positive relation between UD laws and financial leverage is more pronounced for firms that face 
higher shareholder litigation risk ex ante and financially constrained firms. We investigate the 
possibility that firms increase debt financing as a governance device to substitute for weaker 
shareholder litigation rights but find little evidence in support of this argument. Overall, our 
evidence indicates that the adoption of UD laws reduces shareholder litigation risk, motivating 
firms to use more debt financing in their capital structures that enhance firm value.  
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Appendix A: Variables Definition 
 
Variable name  Construction  Data source  
Book leverage The ratio of book value of short-term and 
long-term debts to book value of assets.  
 
Compustat 
Dividend dummy An indicator equals 1 if a firm pays a 
common dividend in a given year, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Compustat 
Market leverage 
 
The ratio of the book value of debt to the 
market value of assets. 
 
Compustat  
Market-to-book ratio  
 
The ratio of the market value of assets to the 
book value of assets. 
 
Compustat 
Modified Z-Score The modified Altman’s z-score calculated as 
(1.2×(wcap/at) + 1.4×(re/at) + 3.3×(ebit/at) + 
(sale/at)). 
 
Compustat 
Political balance The state-level fraction of the Democratic 
Party members in the House of 
Representatives in a given year. 
 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Profitability The ratio of income before extraordinary 
items including depreciation and amortization 
to the book value of assets. 
 
Compustat 
Size The natural logarithm of the book value of 
assets. 
 
Compustat  
Size-age index The size-age (SA) index is defined as: SA 
index = -0.737 × AT + 0.043 × AT2 – 0.040 × 
Age, where AT is the natural logarithm of 
inflation-adjusted book assets, and Age is the 
number of years the firm has been included in 
Compustat. 
 
Compustat 
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State GDP Growth The state-level GDP growth rate over the 
fiscal year.  
 
U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
State GDP Per Capita  The natural logarithm of a state GDP per 
capita. 
 
U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Tangibility The ratio of property, plant, and equipment to 
the book value of assets. 
 
Compustat 
UD law An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 
for the firms incorporated in state has passed 
the UD law in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collection 
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Table 1: Universal Demand (UD) Laws Adoption 
Table 1 lists the states that adopted UD laws over the sample period 1985-2009. 
 
UD Law Adoption Year State 
1989 Georgia 
1989 Michigan 
1990 Florida 
1991 Wisconsin 
1992 Montana 
1992 Virginia 
1992 Utah 
1993 New Hampshire 
1993 Mississippi 
1995 North Carolina 
1996 Arizona 
1996 Nebraska 
1997 Connecticut 
1997 Maine 
1997 Pennsylvania 
1997 Texas 
1997 Wyoming 
1998 Idaho 
2001 Hawaii 
2003 Iowa 
2004 Massachusetts 
2005 Rhode Island 
2005 South Dakota 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the samples of financial leverage models. UD law is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the years in which UD law is effective in a firm’s state 
of incorporation, and 0 otherwise. Book leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book 
value of assets. Market leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the market value of assets. 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Market-to-book is defined as 
the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Profitability is the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items including depreciation and amortization to the book value of assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to the book value of assets. Dividend 
dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays dividend in a given year, and 
0 otherwise. Modified Z-Score is calculated as 1.2×(wcap/at) + 1.4×(re/at) + 3.3×(ebit/at) + 
(sale/at). Appendix A provides the definitions of the variables. 
 
Variable N Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev. 
UD Law 103,477 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.289 
Book Leverage 103,477 0.205 0.021 0.169 0.335 0.191 
Market Leverage 103,477 0.208 0.010 0.127 0.337 0.230 
Size 103,477 4.553 3.012 4.446 5.992 2.158 
Market-to-book 103,477 2.207 1.074 1.467 2.341 2.262 
Profitability 103,477 0.027 -0.004 0.101 0.166 0.274 
Tangibility 103,477 0.270 0.091 0.206 0.387 0.224 
Dividend dummy 103,477 0.259 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.438 
Modified Z-Score 103,477 0.753 0.390 1.706 2.634 3.797 
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Table 3: UD Laws and Financial Leverage: Baseline Regressions 
Table 3 reports the results of the financial leverage regressions. The dependent variable is either 
Book leverage or Market leverage. UD law is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the 
years in which UD law is effective in a firm’s state of incorporation, and 0 otherwise. Book 
leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets. Market leverage is the 
ratio of the book value of debt to the market value of assets. Size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the book value of assets. Market-to-book is defined as the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items 
including depreciation and amortization to the book value of assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
property, plant, and equipment to the book value of assets. Dividend dummy is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays dividend in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Modified Z-Score 
is calculated as 1.2×(wcap/at) + 1.4×(re/at) + 3.3×(ebit/at) + (sale/at). Other variables are defined 
in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by states 
of incorporation are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Book Leverage   Market Leverage 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
UD Law 0.011** 0.013** 0.013** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (1.99) (2.10) (2.05) (2.77) (3.09) (2.98) 
Size 0.036*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (28.04) (37.62) (37.86) (27.58) (36.97) (36.93) 
Market-to-book -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (17.88) (14.59) (14.77) (15.98) (14.86) (15.00) 
Profitability -0.080*** 0.002 0.002 -0.122*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 (10.74) (0.37) (0.41) (14.01) (9.58) (9.48) 
Tangibility 0.215*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.219*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 
 (26.95) (25.33) (25.37) (22.72) (20.71) (20.85) 
Dividend dummy  -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
  (17.49) (17.34) (16.68) (16.46) 
Modified Z-Score  -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (19.86) (20.05) (15.62) (15.80) 
State GDP growth  -0.075***  -0.266*** 
  (3.86)  (8.40) 
State GDP per capita  -0.013  -0.038 
  (0.57)  (1.64) 
Intercept -0.046*** -0.097*** 0.047 -0.012 -0.053*** 0.355 
 (6.71) (14.35) (0.18) (1.06) (4.37) (1.43) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 103,477  103,477  103,477  103,477  103,477  103,477  
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.65 0.65   0.65 0.66 0.66 
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Table 4: UD Laws and Financial Leverage – Dynamic Models 
Table 4 reports the results of the dynamic financial leverage regressions. The dependent variable 
is either Book leverage or Market leverage. Book leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to 
the book value of assets. Market leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the market value 
of assets. The five indicator variables UD laws-2, UD laws-1, UD laws0, UD laws+1, and UD laws≥+2 
are set to one if the firm is incorporated in a state that will pass the UD law next two years, will 
pass the UD law next year, passes the law this year, passed the law one year ago, and passed the 
law two or more years ago, respectively. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics 
based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by states of incorporation are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Book Leverage   Market Leverage 
Variable (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
UD Law -2 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015* -0.013* -0.012* 
 (0.65) (0.11) (0.09) (1.82) (1.67) (1.68) 
UD Law -1 0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.11) (0.74) (0.76) (1.25) (0.76) (0.83) 
UD Law 0 0.012** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.007 0.010 0.011 
 (2.33) (2.94) (2.87) (0.86) (1.43) (1.57) 
UD Law +1 0.011* 0.014** 0.013** 0.007 0.010 0.008 
 (1.74) (2.26) (2.14) (0.95) (1.52) (1.29) 
UD Law ≥+2 0.010  0.014* 0.014*  0.017** 0.020** 0.021** 
 (1.32) (1.74) (1.71) (1.99) (2.33) (2.29) 
Size 0.036*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (27.99) (37.53) (37.78) (9.78) (36.82) (36.77) 
Market-to-book -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (17.87) (14.59) (14.77) (9.42) (14.85) (15.00) 
Profitability -0.080*** 0.002 0.002 -0.122*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 (10.73) (0.36) (0.40) (6.25) (9.61) (9.52) 
Tangibility 0.215*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.219*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 
 (26.98) (25.36) (25.40) (16.41) (20.77) (20.92) 
Dividend dummy  -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
  (17.43) (17.28) (16.77) (16.54) 
Modified Z-Score  -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (19.84) (20.04) (15.68) (15.87) 
State GDP growth  -0.075***  -0.268*** 
  (3.75)  (8.16) 
State GDP per capita  -0.014  -0.036 
  (0.58)  (1.53) 
Intercept -0.046*** -0.097*** 0.049 -0.011 -0.053*** 0.334 
 (6.66) (14.20) (0.19) (0.63) (4.32) (1.32) 
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Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 103,477  103,477  103,477  103,477  103,477  103,477  
Adjusted R2 0.64  0.65  0.65    0.65  0.66  0.66  
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Table 5: UD Laws and Financial Leverage – Propensity Score Matching 
Table 5 reports the results of the financial leverage regressions using propensity score-matched 
sample over a 7-year period centered on the UD laws adoption years. The dependent variable in 
Panel B is either Book leverage or Market leverage. Book leverage is the ratio of the book value 
of debt to the book value of assets. Market leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the 
market value of assets. Treatment is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the firms 
incorporated in the state that has adopted the UD law, and 0 otherwise. Post is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of 1 for the years in which the UD law has been adopted by a given state, and 0 
otherwise. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered by states of incorporation are reported in parentheses in Panel B. 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Differences in Characteristics of Treatment and Control Firms 
  Pre-Match   Post-Match 
Variable Treatment Control Difference   Treatment Control Difference  
Firm size 4.125  4.467  -0.342*** 4.772  4.850  -0.078  
  (4.81)  (1.13) 
Market-to-book ratio 2.257  2.784  -0.527** 1.917  1.900  0.017 
  (1.99)  (0.44) 
Profitability 0.062  0.028  0.034** 0.036  0.039  -0.003  
  (2.18)  (1.17)  
Tangible assets 0.326  0.274  0.052*** 0.313  0.296  0.017 
      (6.55)       (1.57)  
 
Panel B: UD Laws and Financial Leverage - Propensity Score-Matched Samples 
  Book Leverage Market Leverage 
Variable (1) (2) 
Treatment × Post 0.007* 0.013** 
 (1.72) (2.01) 
Post -0.005 0.001 
 (1.46) (0.07) 
Size 0.084*** 0.089*** 
 (17.94) (11.16) 
Market-to-book -0.007*** -0.036*** 
 (3.86) (11.07) 
Profitability 0.047* -0.023 
 (1.94) (1.27) 
Tangibility 0.205*** 0.228*** 
 (9.28) (7.89) 
Dividend dummy -0.023*** -0.053*** 
 (4.05) (4.47) 
Modified Z-Score -0.039*** -0.042*** 
 (13.43) (8.55) 
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State GDP growth -0.049 -0.199*** 
 (0.74) (2.78) 
State GDP per capita -0.118** -0.092 
 (2.20) (1.32) 
Intercept 1.101* 0.911 
 (1.92) (1.23) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,420  8,420  
Adjusted R2 0.78  0.79  
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Table 6: UD Laws and Financial Leverage – Shareholder Litigation Threats 
Table 6 reports the results of the financial leverage regressions augmented with firms’ shareholder 
litigation threats. The dependent variable is either Book leverage or Market leverage. UD law is 
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the years in which UD law is effective in a firm’s 
state of incorporation, and 0 otherwise. Litigation propensity is the propensity of a firm facing a 
derivative lawsuit in a given year estimated by a probit model. Other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by states of 
incorporation are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Book Leverage   Market Leverage 
Variable (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
UD Law 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.012* 0.013* 0.013* 
 (0.61) (0.74) (0.71) (1.88) (1.94) (1.86) 
UD Law × Litigation propensity 1.226*** 1.554*** 1.549*** 1.150*** 1.476*** 1.448*** 
 (2.69) (2.85) (2.84) (2.99) (3.14) (3.07) 
Litigation propensity -1.945*** -2.371*** -2.366*** -1.770*** -2.215*** -2.188***  (16.17) (19.38) (19.79) (18.22) (16.03) (16.18) 
Size 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 (32.89) (45.56) (45.31) (28.61) (40.83) (40.38) 
Market-to-book -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (11.63) (9.78) (9.81) (11.51) (10.95) (10.99) 
Profitability -0.117*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.178*** -0.071*** -0.070*** 
 (11.15) (3.13) (3.23) (14.28) (13.50) (13.47) 
Tangibility 0.187*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.200*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 
 (23.77) (19.69) (19.72) (20.65) (17.00) (17.23) 
Dividend dummy  -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.068*** -0.067*** 
  (21.40) (21.39) (15.98) (15.72) 
Modified Z-Score  -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  (9.21) (9.26) (8.49) (8.56) 
State GDP growth  -0.065***  -0.276*** 
  (3.65)  (9.82) 
State GDP per capita  0.004  -0.006 
  (0.16)  (0.23) 
Intercept -0.068*** -0.109*** -0.154 -0.043*** -0.079*** -0.017 
 (8.73) (13.49) (0.56) (3.54) (5.57) (0.06) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 84,949  84,949  84,949  84,949  84,949  84,949  
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.68 0.68   0.68 0.69 0.69 
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Table 7: UD Laws and Financial Leverage – Financial Constraints 
Table 7 reports the results of the financial leverage regressions for financially constrained (FC) 
and unconstrained (Non-FC) subgroups. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are Book 
leverage and Market leverage, respectively. UD law is an indicator variable that takes a value of 
1 for the years in which UD law is effective in a firm’s state of incorporation, and 0 otherwise. 
Financially constrained (unconstrained) firms include those in the top (bottom) tercile of the SA 
index, do not pay dividend (pay dividend), or do not have credit ratings (have credit ratings). The 
models are estimated with other control variables and firm- and year-fixed effects but their 
estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by states of incorporation are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: UD Laws and Book Leverage – Financial Constraints   
  S&P Credit Ratings   Dividend Payout   SA Index  
 FC Non-FC   FC Non-FC   FC Non-FC 
Variable  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
UD Law 0.016** -0.026*** 0.014* 0.003 0.010* -0.003 
 (2.26) (3.24) (1.86) (0.44) (1.70) (0.44) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 85,231 18,246 76,704 26,773 34,492 34,493 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.73   0.64 0.76   0.61 0.74 
 
Panel B: UD Laws and Market Leverage – Financial Constraints 
  S&P Credit Ratings   Dividend Payout   SA Index  
 FC Non-FC   FC Non-FC   FC Non-FC 
Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
UD Law 0.017** -0.002 0.021** 0.012 0.008* 0.012 
 (2.00) (0.16) (2.03) (1.62) (1.76) (1.20) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 85,231 18,246 76,704 26,773 34,492 34,493 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.76   0.66 0.76   0.64 0.74 
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Table 9: UD Laws and Financial Leverage – Controlling for Other Laws 
Table 9 reports the results of the financial leverage regressions that additionally control for BC, 
PP, CS, FP and DD laws or the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 
The dependent variable is either Book leverage or Market leverage. UD law is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of 1 for the years in which UD law is effective in a firm’s state of incorporation, 
and 0 otherwise. BC law (PP law) is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the years in 
which a firm’s state of incorporation has passed the Business Combination law (Poison Pill law), 
and 0 otherwise. CS law (FP law or DD law) is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the 
years in which a firm’s state of incorporation has passed the Control Share Acquisition law (Fair 
Price law or Directors’ Duties law, respectively) and 0 otherwise. PSLRA adoption is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 for the years in which the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
is effective, and 0 otherwise. The models are estimated with other controls and firm- and year-
fixed effects but their estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered by states of incorporation are reported in parentheses. The symbols 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Book Leverage    Market Leverage 
Variable (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
UD Law 0.012** 0.013** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (2.19) (2.03) (2.77) (2.80) 
BC Law 0.004  0.003  0.002  0.001  
 (0.72) (0.63) (0.29) (0.23) 
PP Law 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 
 (0.89) (1.04) (0.29) (0.52) 
PSLRA Adoption -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.034** -0.034** 
 (2.96) (4.02) (2.30) (2.32) 
CS Law  -0.006 -0.002 
  (1.12) (0.33) 
FP Law  0.002 0.002 
  (0.23) (0.30) 
DD Law  -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.08) (0.29) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 103,477  103,477  103,477  103,477  
Adjusted R2 0.65  0.65     0.66  0.66  
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Table 10: UD Laws and Net Debt Issues 
Table 10 reports the results of the net debt issues regressions. The dependent variable is Net Debt 
Issues calculated as the difference between long-term debt issuance and long-term debt reduction, 
scaled by the book value of assets. UD law is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the 
years in which UD law is effective in a firm’s state of incorporation, and 0 otherwise. FD is 
financing deficit measured as cash dividends plus net investments plus the change in working 
capital, less cash flow, all scaled by the book value of assets. Δ indicates the change in variable 
value from the preceding year to the current year. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by states of incorporation are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Net Debt Issues 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
UD Law 0.001  0.001  0.001  
 (0.34) (0.28) (0.16) 
UD Law×FD  0.087*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 
 (2.68) (2.73) (2.75) 
FD 0.009  0.012  0.011  
 (0.91) (1.03) (1.04) 
FD×Lagged book leverage -0.033 -0.035 -0.046 
 (0.72) (0.60) (0.61) 
Lagged book leverage -0.181*** -0.174*** -0.171*** 
 (25.05) (24.41) (24.86) 
FD×ΔSize -0.007 -0.006* 0.004 
 (1.60) (1.83) (0.59) 
ΔSize 0.100*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 
 (13.13) (12.62) (10.98) 
FD×ΔMarket-to-book -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.53) (0.33) (0.37) 
ΔMarket-to-book 0.001  0.001  0.000  
 (1.56) (0.89) (0.26) 
FD×ΔProfitability 0.047* 0.048 0.038 
 (1.87) (1.49) (1.28) 
ΔProfitability -0.079*** -0.022 -0.017 
 (8.68) (1.45) (1.17) 
FD×Δtangibility 0.083* 0.089* 0.046  
 (1.68) (1.68) (0.70) 
ΔTangibility 0.011 0.007 0.018 
 (0.60) (0.34) (0.81) 
FD×ΔDividend dummy  -0.047* -0.045* 
  (1.83) (1.75) 
ΔDividend dummy  -0.005** -0.005** 
  (2.07) (2.26) 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230102
 
 
60 
 
FD×ΔModified Z-Score  0.00  0.002* 
  (0.14) (1.70) 
ΔModified Z-Score  -0.009*** -0.010*** 
  (5.17) (5.63) 
FD×ΔState GDP growth  0.242  
  (0.79) 
ΔState GDP growth  0.014  
  (0.49) 
FD×ΔState GDP per capita  0.161* 
  (1.82) 
ΔState GDP per capita  -0.158*** 
  (4.07) 
Intercept 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 
 (5.35) (4.66) (4.06) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 91,313 91,313 91,313 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.19 0.2 
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